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In a brief article entitled "Quantifiers and Propositional Atti-
tudes," written by W
. V. 0. Quine 1 in 1956 there are ideas which con-
tinue to occupy us today at least as much as they did twenty years
ago and which have become part of today's common philosophical wis-
dom. It was here, for example, that Quine described the serious log-
ical problems involved in quanti f ication into propositional attitude
contexts, such as in 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a
spy 1
,
which he represented as
(0 ( 3a:) (Ralph be 1 i eves x is a spy )
.
It was in this context as well that we were alerted to what Quine
called the 'vast' difference between sentences such as (l) and those
such as 'Ralph believes there are spies', which is rendered as
(2) Ralph believes that (3a:) (a: is a spy).
As we now well know, Quine argued that the second would be true for
most of us while the first would not; (1) contains (in Quine's words)
urgent information' and thereby has a special importance. Many phil-
osophers continue to consider this distinction as fundamental.
Quine also proposed, in his '56 article, a rule which he called
exportation, which essentially allows inferences from the opaque to
the transparent; thus if
(3) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy
l The Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956) 177-187; reprinted (minus 15 lines)
in L.Linsky, ed
. ,
Reference and Modality (Oxford Univ. Press, 1971).
All references are to the latter edition.
1
2then, assuming that Ortcutt exists, we could conclude that
(A) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy.
Kaplan (and others)? haVe argued, and many philosophers have been
convinced, that the rule of exportation, is as Quine states it, in-
valid: exportation makes it possible to infer sentences such as (l)
which contain urgent information from sentences such as (2) which
contain no urgent information. Kaplan's argument was as follows:
Assume that Ralph believes in spies and that he believes (correctly)
that one among them is the shortest. He thus believes that the
shortest spy is a spy. If the above rule of exportation is valid
(and if spies exist) then Ralph believes of the shortest spy that he
is a spy. Then, by existential generalization, it follows that there
is someone Ralph believes to be a spy. The force of the arugment is
that the last consequence would seem to convey urgent information,
yet we never made the assumption that Ralph has a particular spy in
mind.
Kaplan's view of this state of affairs was (in part) that it in-
dicated that the subject, S, must bear a strong epistemic relation to
the object S' s belief is about. The subject must, Kaplan said, have a
very clear and very solid conception of an object, x
,
if s/he is to
have a transparent belief about x; the object must play a central role
"David Kaplan, "Quantifying In", D. Davidson and J. Hintikka, eds
.
,
Words and Objections (Dordrecht: Re i del, 1969); reprinted in Refer-
ence and Modality
,
op. cit. All references are to the latter edition.
See also Robert Sleigh, "On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts",
Notts 1 (1967) 1 _ 31, p. 28; and Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief
(Cornell Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 1 A 1 - 1 44
.
3in S's 'inner story 1
.
3 This idea was an extension of the notion that
(1) conveys urgent information about a spy. In the above example, of
course, Ralph has no idea who the shortest spy is and thus his belief
is obviously lacking in importance. Indeed, this is just the problem
with the example: while (l) is supposed to carry such information,
Ralph knows no spies.
More recently, articles have appeared by Ernest Sosa and others 4
which contend, in effect, that Kaplan's 'shortest spy argument 1 shows
that (1) can be inferred from (2). These philosophers also deny that
the subject must have the sort of strong connection with the object
that Kaplan advocates, though (at least) Chisholm requires that some
weak epistemic relation hold between subject and object. These phil-
osophers reject, then, the idea that (1) must convey urgent informa-
tion.
While this more recent work evidences a shift away from Kaplan's
pos i t ion
,
no extended analysis of this new view has been provided.
q
Kapl an requires, more exactly, that S have a vivid name, a, of x,
where a denotes x. No precise definition is (or can be) given for
what a vivid name is but it is, in part, the "suitably arranged and
regimented ... conglomeration of images, names and partial descrip-
tions which Ralph employs to bring x before his mind" op. ait., p.
136. The conditions under which a term a is a name of x for S is
not precisely definable either but, roughly put, x must have played
a major role in the causal chain resulting in S's use of the name
(cf. pp. 132-137).
4 Ernest Sosa, "Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re ", The
Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970) 883 - 896. See also E. Sosa "Re-
joinder to Hintikka", Journal of Philosophy 68 (1970 ^98-501;
and Mark Pastin, "About De Re Belief", Philosophy and Phenomen-
ological Research 3*+ (197*0 569 - 575; and Roderick Chisholm, "Knowl-
edge and Belief: ' De Dicto 1 and ' De Re 1 ", Philosophical Studies
29 (1976) 1-20; and R. Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical
Study (Open Court Publishing Company, 1976) 168-172. Chisholm's
view requires that there be some weak epistemic connection between
the subject and the object.
kThese issues, however, have implications for some quite basic ques-
tions of semantic theory (as will soon be seen) and it is therefore
important that such an analysis be provided.
We will provide, then, a sustained and thorough argument for the
position that wide scope sentences of propositional attitude, such as
(U, can be inferred from narrow scope sentences of propositional at-
titude, such as (2). We shall contend, furthermore, that the only
major condition on this inference is that the object the attitude is
about is specifiable. While we shall not undertake to provide a de-
tailed account of the literature on this subject, we will, at the ap-
propriate points of contact, consider the views of Sosa as they re-
late to the analysis we will o f fe r
.
Though Quine did not place a great deal of emphasis on exporta-
tion, the validity of this rule, as was seen by Kaplan, raises im-
portant questions--i t leads us to consider, first of all, to what ex-
tent the semantics for a natural language should util i ze psychological
notions. This question has been raised most directly by Barbara Par-
tee in her aptly titled article "Seman t i cs --Ma thema t i cs or Psychology?". 5
Ms. Partee takes the question very broadly: she wishes to know whether
semantics is a branch of psychology (which she describes as part of
the Chomskyian view that linguistics is part of psychology) or whether
it is a branch of mathematics, a view which she attributes to Montague
J To appear in R. Bauerle, U. Egl i and A. von Stechow, eds., Semantics
From Different Points of View (Proceedings of the Konstanz Colloquim
on Semantics
,
18th to 22nd September 1978
)
,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
( proj ec ted 1 979 )
•
5and his followers. G While Partee does not specifically discuss the
rule of exportation, analysis of that rule sheds an interesting light
on her question.
For Kaplan, as well as for many other philosophers, the lesson
of exportation is that semantic theory, if it is to account for prop-
ositional attitudes, must directly appeal to the psychological states
of the subject (other than the one in question). Kaplan, as we said,
interprets the fact that exportation warrants the inference from (2)
to (1) to mean that cond i t ions- -wh i ch include the stipulation that
the subject must have a very clear conception of the relevant object--
must be added to the rule of exportation which block (what he finds
to be) the anomalies which would otherwise be present. Thus, he can
disallow exportation of 'the shortest spy' on the grounds that Ralph
does not have a clear enough conception of who the shortest spy is.
To this extent Kaplan's analysis appeals to psychological notions;
indeed, even his logical representations contain symbols which indi-
cate how clear an idea the subject has of the object. ^ The effect of
the position we advocate (that the inference from (2) to (l) is not
an anomaly) will, on the other hand, be to provide an argument against
a further openi nq of the door to psychology.
r
As Partee describes the Chomskyan view it "...derives from taking the
central goal of linguistic theory to be an account of what the native
speaker of a language knows when he or she knows a language, and of
how such knowledge is acquired", op. cit., p. 1. Montague's views can
be found in his Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague,
ed
. and with an introduction by Richmond Thomason (Yale Univ. Press,
197^). Partee also ascribes the view that semantics is not a branch
of psychology to Frege and notes that it is endorsed by Thomason in
his introduction to Formal Philosophy
.
7op. cit.
,
p. 138.
6While exportation is an issue of some importance, it was not or-
iginally given extended consideration by Quine. Neither did the dis-
tinction between (1) and (2) receive more than passing attention,
though it too is worthy of close study. Quine's statement that (l)
tells us that there is a particular individual that the subject has
some meaningful connection to— that Ralph has some idea of a par-
ticular person who he considers to be a spy—is crucial to Kaplan's
claim that the inference from (2) to (l) is anomalous: the inference
is suspect because it, so to speak, generates an idea of the object
in the subject s h ead ((l)) where one wa s not previously present ((2)).
Moreover, the restrictions mentioned above, which Kaplan amends to
exportation in light of this fact, receive their initial legitimacy
from the assumption that the subject has some special knowledge of
the object to begin with.
The lessons drawn from considering exportation are also relevant
to understanding the nature of transparent bel ief . The idea that sen-
tences such as (1) are informative (in a way that (2) is not) along
with what that idea was used to show—that exportation is not valid—
as well as Kaplan's subsequent extension of that idea, all directly
influence our present conception of transparent belief. Thus the
position developed here is not only relevant to the relation of psy-
chology to semantic theory but also presents a revised picture of
transparent belief according to which the subject need not have any
sort of strong epistemic relation to the object s/he has a belief a-
bout
.
7While the need for considering exportation and its relation to
the type of information that (l) conveys is evident, the focus of
"Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes" was on the problem of quan-
tifying into propositional attitude contexts, another issue rel-
evant to the relation between psychology and semantics. While the
origins of-as opposed to the solutions to- this problem have been
given little attention, such a consideration shows that Quine was led
to the formulation of the problem by a consideration of, what he found
to be, certain troublesome properties of transparent belief, which
we will later be discussing. As will be seen, it is his attempt to
deal with these factors which makes quantifying in problematic. We
will show that the original problem of transparent belief is, how-
ever, problematic only under assumptions about the subject's relation
to the relevant object which we challenge. Thus, if our arguments
concerning exportation and the distinction in informativeness between
(1) and (2) are correct, the motivation for the introduction of the
problem of quantifying in is mitigated.
Our claims, then, will be that while Quine's distinction be tween
(1) and (2) is often taken for granted, it is not necessarily the
case that (l) conveys urgent information— (l) may be true and yet
Ralph may lack any real epistemic relation to the object. Though
it is also widely believed that Quine's rule of exportation is in-
valid (without Kaplan's amendments) we will try to use the previous
result to show that while Kaplan is correct in maintaining that ex-
portation allows the inference from (2) to (l), this is not, as he
8maintains, an anomaly of exportat i on-- i . e. (2) does imply (l). The
upshot of these claims will be that Quine's motivation for introduc-
ing the problem of quantifying in is undermined.
CHAPTER II
While Quine both endorsed exportation and found a 'vast' difference
between (1) and (2), Kaplan's 'shortest spy' argument has amply demon-
strated the difficulty involved in holding both of these views. We take
issue with the assumption that Quine was mistaken about exportation
rather than about the urgency of (1). While Kaplan assumed the latter
to be correct and used this to demonstrate the folly of the former, the
opposite argument could also have been made. We contend that Quine was
in fact mistaken about the urgency of (1).
An explanation of why sentences such as (l) are commonly thought
to be urgent involves considerations not only of semantic issues but al-
so of pragmatic ones. The informativeness of a sentence is contingent
upon a range of factors which include the amount of information already
known and the amount of information which is expected. In terms of ordin-
ary discourse it would, of course, be expected that an assertion that has
the form of (1) would be informative: it would certainly be misleading to
tell the authorities "There Is someone Ralph believes to be a spy," if it
was not thought that Ralph had an acauaintance with at least one spy.
There is a strong pragmatic intuition that this is an assertion that Ralph
is acquainted with a spy. We do not contend that there is any other 'nat-
ural' use of this sentence. The question raised here is whether such a
sentence, strictly and semantically speaking, is false if the subject has
no direct acquaintance with the object.
9
10
Cons i der
:
The President is going to die.
Though this sentence would ordinarily be used in such a way as to
be considered false if the President was not in some form of immedi-
ate danger, it is, strictly speaking, true by virtue of the Presi-
dent's mortality alone. Similarly, while (l) would not, under ordin-
ary curcumstances, be considered to be true if Ralph was not directly
acquainted with at least one spy, this does not entail that there is
no such i nterpretat ion. In both cases a distinction must be made be-
tween pragmatic intuitions and semantic facts. The following assumes
this distinction and considers whether there is a (semantic) interpre-
tation of wide scope sentences such that the subject is not directly
acquainted with the object.
Before beginning note that Kaplan does not maintain that exporta-
tion should be forgotten as a si ip of the pen on the part of an other-
wise careful philosopher but rather feels that the intuition behind
the rule is correct. That (l) can be inferred from (2) under exporta-
tion is interpreted to mean that amendments are required to avoid the
unwarranted creation of urgency. Moreover, he takes these amendmen ts--
particularly the requirement that S have a vivid conception of ar--to
say something quite important about the nature of belief. The effect
of his alteration, though, is that exportation will only be allowed
if, essentially, the subject knows who the object is. Thus, presumably,
only if Ralph believes in spies because he has a vivid conception of
one will it follow that there is someone Ralph believes to be a spy.
While this maneuver can be interpreted as saving the inference from (2)
to (1), through the addition of extra premises, the effect is that the
original belief ((2)) conjoined with these extra premises carries as
much urgency as (l): if Ralph believes in spies because he has a clear
idea of who one is
,
then the FBI should find Ralph's belief in spies
quite urgent.
While the (possible) inference from (3) to (k) and thereby to
(1) is generally invalid under the assumption that (l) means only
that there is a particular person Ralph knows or has in mind who is
such that Ralph believes about him that he is a spy, (l) can also be
interpreted in such a way that it conveys no urgent information. (l)
may be true, that is, even though Ralph does not have a spy clearly
in mind. Let us call this the weak version of (l) (or 'weak belief')
and refer to it as O') and let us call the usual interpretation of
(1) whereby It conveys urgent information the strong version of trans-
parent belief (or 'strong belief'). Even though Ralph has no one in
particular clearly in mind in believing that the shortest spy is a
spy, we could conceivably (assuming there are spies) institute a
search for the shortest among all spies. Once we have located him,
in his office at CIA headquaters say, we could grab him by the should-
er, point directly at him and could say, "Ralph believes you are a
spy," for if Ralph believes the shortest spy is a spy and the person
we are pointing to is the shortest spy, there is a sense in which he
believes the person we are pointing to is a spy. Thus (l) is true,
under this interpretation, for this is the particular person Ralph be-
lieves to be a spy. There is, we might say, someone who can be des-
ignated by an outside observer as being the individual Ralph believes
to be a spy, though Ralph does not have a clear conception of any
spies. 8 The inference from (2) to (1) (via (3) and (k)) now appears
plausible: urgent information is not created by means of the infer-
ence, for (l 1 ) does not convey such information. On the weak inter-
pretation of (1) exportation does not have unexplainable consequences.
This, roughly put, is the idea that we will develop and defend.
If Ralph believes someone is the shortest spy and hence that the
shortest spy is a spy (thus having no one in particular clearly in
mind), is there someone Ralph's beliefs concern--is there someone
his beliefs are about? The point of the attributive belief ascrip-
tion is, after all, that there is no one in particular that Ralph
is thinking about. But if there was no one Ra lph's beliefs concern-
ed how could it be that we could find the relevant individual? Who
is this person we have searched out if not the person Ralph's beliefs
are about? Ralph would acknowledge, as most of us would, that since
there are spies there must be a shortest one (let us say), though
he does not have any idea who this individual really is. But while
Ralph does not know who this person is, there must nonetheless be such
a person. While in some sense it doesn't matter to Ralph who this
person is--he believes that whoever it is, is a spy--there is in ac-
tuality a unique individual who is that person--he is the shortest
spy. Here one might grant that there is someone who is the shortest
8 Thus (l) either may, or may not, convey urgent information
spy, but maintain nontheless that since Ralph does not have that per-
son clearly in mind that Ralph does not have beliefs about that par-
ticular person. It is necessary, in order to resolve this issue, to
distinguish Ralph having someone in particular clearly in mind (which
he doesn't) from there being someone his beliefs happen to concern or
be aoout (which there is); the two are not necessarily the same. Ralph
does not have any one individual clearly in mind because he does not
know who the shortest spy is, but if he were shown the shortest spy
(in such a way that he was identifiable as such) we wouldn't say Ralph
had spoken incorrectly if he responded that that is the person his
beliefs concerned.
The basic contention here is over whether one can have a de re
belief about someone one does not have a vivid name of. Can I, for
example, now form a belief about the last person to die in 1979 on
the largest commune north of Peking? While I have no acquaintance,
except by description, with this person, I certainly do believe that
he or she was Chinese and that he or she was, more likely than not,
ill. While I don't have any significant beliefs about this person
this does not necessarily mean that I do not have some beliefs about
him or her. In general, I seem to have beliefs about almost indefi-
nitely many things which I don't have a vivid name for.
If Ralph has thoughts about no particular spy, why do we keep
wanting to point to the individual we have cornered as the shortest
spy when Ralph has certain thoughts? If he is thinking of no one in
particular is he just as much thinking of the tall spies as the short-
uer ones? And, finally, would we want to say that Ralph was incorrect
if he were to say that his thoughts ultimately concern some one per-
son?
Because Ralph is thinking that whoever is the shortest spy is a
spy does not mean that he does not have beliefs about one particular
individual. The locution 'whoever' means that the person (thing) who
(that) fits the description could be any number of different people
(things). Thus in stating that Ralph believes that the shortest spy,
whoever he ^s
,
is a spy, we emphasize that Ralph doesn't know which
individual the shortest spy is. It is quite different, however, to
say that because Ralph does not know who the actual shortest spy is
that there is no one he thinks is the shortest spy. Ralph's (lack of)
knowledge of what individual is really the shortest spy does not prej-
udice the fact that he has bel iefs about him.
Kaplan, following Quine, makes the assumption that (1) conveys
urgent i nfo rma t i on^ -
- tha t Ralph knows a spy. And so, since the wide
scope representation has come to represent transparent belief, urgency
While we have until now been speaking of the association of urgent in-
formation with transparent belief, it is the i d i osync rac i es of the ex-
amples which have been used in the literature which make the word 'ur-
gent' appropriate. If, for example, there was someone Ralph believed
to be an adulterer, there would not, on any interpretation of this be-
lief be information that Ralph could convey that we could properly call
'urgent'. Yet while the word changes the point remains the same: on
one i n te r pre ta t i on of this belief Ralph has someone in mind. Thus to
properly generalize Quine's example would be to equate transparent be-
lief with the subject having someone (or something) in particular in
mind as the object of his belief. Thus while having someone (something)
in particular in mind as the object of one's belief is not necessarily
to have information that could appropriately be called 'urgent', we will
continue to use this word to apply to the more general situation of the
subject having someone (something) in particular in mind.
15
of information has come to be closely tied with transparent attitudes
The distinction between O'), and the standard interpretation of
(1) whereby it conveys urgent i n forma t i on, ca 11 s into question this e-
quation of transparent belief with urgent information, for weak be-
lief does not convey urgent information. The idea that transparent
belief conveys urgent information assumes that to have transparent at
titudes is to have some idea of who the object in question is, for to
have information of the sort the authorities would be interested in
is to have in mind (at least to some degree) someone you think is a
spy. It is however possible, we argue, for one to have transparent
attitudes about an individual without being, so to speak, repre-
sentational 1 y related to that i nd i v i d ua 1 --wi thout having someone in
particular clearly in mind. This argument, of course, eventually
comes down to the claim that one can believe (transparently) of the
shortest spy that he is a spy (when one merely believes in spies and
thinks there must be a shortest one). While we defined a sense of
be 1 i ef --weak bel ief--whereby we could say that such a belief indeed
had some of the characteristics of transparent bel ief in so far as it
concerned the object in question, our wea k belief still may no t im-
mediately resemble transparent belief and thus it must be argued that
it has all the essential characteristics thereof.
While this task would conflict with a definition of transpar-
ent belief according to which it carries urgent information, this as-
sociation has come about because of the general association of the
wide scope sentence (which may convey urgent information) with trans-
16
parent belief. But the association of transparent belief with the wide
reading is valid ultimately because the latter is open to applications
of the principle of s ubst i tut i v i ty of identicals, 10 and so it is this
Leibmzian idea which is the more central one and which the idea of
urgency is derivative of. Certainly it would be no exaggeration to
say that the subst i tut i v i ty principle is the hallmark of transparent
belief. We will examine weak belief, then, and show that it holds up
to this test. Success here will make it improper to rule that weak
belief cannot legitimately be termed transparent solely because it
carries no urgent information; it is part of what we will try to show
that urgency is a misplaced notion.
To speak generally first, subst i tutivi ty of identicals can be
said to apply to those belief sentences which are interpreted to say
that the subject's bel iefs are about an object, for if they are about
an object-~if the subject believes of 1
1
someone that he has P--then he
bel i eves of this same person that he has P even though that person is
picked out in some other way--it is still a belief of the same person.
On the other hand one may have a belief that someone has P, where the
belief is not so much about the person as involving the particular
conception the believer has of the object. The former permits of sub-
stitution because the subject's conception of the object is not in
question and so substitution of a different term designating the same
object will not affect the truth of the belief sentence. The latter,
10 The next two paragraphs may be taken as support for this assertion.
1J By emphasizing 'of' I do not thereby intend Kaplan's sense of 'ofness'.
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on the other hand, since it does involve the believer's conception,
will be affected by describing the belief differently.
It is natural, then, to equate the wide scope reading of belief
ascriptions with transparent belief since the former seems to be
speaking about the particular object and saying that the subject has
beliefs about it. Since weak belief is an interpretation of the mean-
ing of this wide scope representat ion— i .e. it speaks of a particular
object and says that the subject's beliefs are about it— it would
follow by the above reasoning that it is transparent.
It is important to challenge the definition of transparent belief
in terms of urgent information not only because of its obvious bearing
on exportation and Kaplan's discussion thereof, but because it direct-
ly cha 1 lenges the assumption that the subject must have a clear impres-
sion of who (or what) the object of his belief is. If, that is, weak
belief is all it has been argued it is— if transparent belief does not
necessarily convey urgent information then it is not necessary that
the subject know who the relevant object is in order to have a trans-
parent belief about that object. The way this assumption has been
challenged, then, has been by arguing that weak belief qualifies as
transparent belief. 12
It would be incorrect to think that since transparent belief, at
19 •
It might be thought that it would be possible to get around this point
by arguing that Kaplan has shown that to avoid the anomalies of exporta-
tion we need to require that the subject have a clear conception of who
the object is. We have shown, however, that the presence of such anom-
alies assumes that there is only interpretation of (l) and that along
the lines of Ralph knowing who the object is.
18
its fundamental level, relates the subject directly to the object
that the subject must have at least some idea who the object is. The
subject can be directly related to the object from an outside view-
point as well. S/he can be related to the object, that is, in the
sense that we (or some other outside observer) pair them (or relate
them). That is, it may be that though the subject has no particular
individual clearly in mind, as with the belief about the shortest
spy, we can nevertheless say that the person that the subject's
thoughts are in fact about is this particular individual that we have
found is the shortest spy. On this interpretation we as outside ob-
server take responsibility for relating the subject and the object.
We, in this case, are construing the relevant sentence as relating
subject and object. By construing the sentence in this way it is o-
pen to subst i tut i vi ty of identicals and thus is transparent.
The foregoing should show that the word 'concern', is used in a
very weak sense so as not to lean too heavily on this somewhat vague
notion. It is used merely to mean that the subject and object can be
related by an outside observer in the manner discussed earlier. We
have tried to show that this weak use of 'concern' is nonetheless ap-
propriately used in terming Ralph's beliefs transparent.
The problem with exportation for Kaplan is that it puts us en
rapport with too many things. He says, accordingly, that "the inter-
esting relational sense of belief ... which I suppose Quine to have
been getting at with [1] is one which provides Ralph with access to
19
some but not all persons of whom he can frame names"
.
1
3
It is ture
that our weak construal of (1) would provide Ralph with access to
all the persons of whom he can frame names, but even though it may be
interesting and valuable to have an interpretation of belief such
that the subject has access only to those individuals that "play a
leading role in his 'inner story'," we maintain this is not the only
interpretation that (1), as it happens, is capable of. Kaplan and
Quine take the observation of the conveyence of urgent information
by (1) to mean that (1) must convey such information. There is no
argument, however, for this inference: no evidence is presented to the
effect that because (l) is naturally construed as having importance,
that it can be taken no other way. Such evidence, were one to try to
offer it, would have to consist of a demonstration to the effect that
the sentence did not make sense if it was taken other than the way
Quine proposes. But such a demonstration could not be made. Why
would (1) not make sense if Ralph did not clearly have in mind any
spies (if the assumption is not made that the sentence must convey im-
portant information)? If we can bring ourselves to think of Ralph as
standing in relation to the object while he knows practically nothing
of this person--i.e. if the question begging assumption is removed--
then we can conceive of Ralph as having thoughts of the shortest spy.
But what sort of attitude does he have about this object if he doesn't
have beliefs about him. It is not that he hopes that the shortest spy
is a spy. He doesn't doubt that he is a spy. Yet he is somehow think-
1 3 D. Kaplan, op. cit. p. 131.
20
i ng about this individual. Or is he?
One might say: "Ralph can't be thinking of that individual who is
the shortest spy for how could he form the thought of him without clear-
ly having him in mind?". The answer is that he doesn't have the in-
dividual in mind to the extent that he knows more than the trivial
things he does about him, yet he does have him in mind enough to form
the thought of him and that to form a thought of him is enough to have
a belief about him. Ralph does think, it will be acknowledged, that
certain people happen to be spies. Being rational, he concludes that
one particular member of this group (which he trivially individuates)
has the property of being a spy as well. Has he not now formed the
thought of one of the members? (Note: he knows little more about the
larger group of spies than about its shortest member, yet it is ob-
vious that he can think of spies (in general)
.) He does not have an
individual in mind in the sense that he knows who he is: he cannot form
a clear picture of him (except with regard to his height), he does not
know his name or social security number (as, indeed, few do) and he
has never met him. But is he not thinking about that person he keeps
having such a vague picture of? We contend that he has the individual
in mind to the extent that it leads him to form a thouhgt and that
this thought has the status of a belief, though he does not have him
in mind so much as to know who he is. He is thinking of a particular
individual; he is thinking he is a spy; he believes he is a spy.
For Kaplan the inference can be made from ( 2 ) to (l) (via (3) and
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W) If the subject has a clear or vivid conception of who the object
is: If one believes in spies because one knows a spy, then there cer-
tainly is someone one knows who one believes to be a spy. What is
claimed here, on the other hand, about the relation between (2) and
((1) interpreted as) (1
•) is that the one follows from the other not
for epistemological reasons but for (what might be loosely be called)
logical reasons: if, believing in spies, one believes that the short-
est spy is a spy (not having any idea of who any are) then there is a
sense in which this means that there is someone, though one doesn't
know who he is, who one believes to be a spy (assuming, of course,
that there are spies and that one is the shortest)
On Kaplan's analysis his new version of the rule of exportation,
which is part of a larger logical system, is dependent on and explain-
ed in terms of something quite removed from logic: the contingent e-
p i s temol og ica 1 state of the believer. Indeed, the relevant concepts
of the believer are directly represented in Kaplan's analysis of (l).
While epistemology may be cleverly dressed up so that it looks ap-
propriate in a logical representation, the fact that two traditionally
separate domains are being conflated should not be overlooked. While
Kaplan of course argues for the position that the subject must have a
vivid conception of the object, he does not consider the cost that ex-
plaining logical representations by appeal to epistemology has for the
intuitiveness of the theory. We take it to be an advantage of our view
then that it does not necessitate the appeal to psychological concepts
in order to explain a logical distinction and thus that a rule of a
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logical system is not dependent for its application upon the ancillary
epistemic states of the bel iever.
On Kaplan's analysis, there is some vividness threshold beyond
which one has a vivid enough conception of the object for exportation
to succeed. Thus there is some point at which one is in some manner
acquainted with the object but where this acquaintance is not vivid
enough to allow for exportation. On the view presented here, however,
it is always the case that if one believes someone is a spy (and there
is a definite description that picks one out), there is someone one
believes a spy (assuming there are spies). 14 There is thus no arbi-
trary line between exportation being successful and not, for on our
view it is successful for logical reasons and is not explained by ap-
peal to psychological concepts.
Let us step back a moment now to examine the logic of the argument
concerning exportation and urgency which has so far been presented. It
was argued, first of all, that Kaplan's method of dealing with the
counter example to exportation was to conclude that we need to have a
sufficiently vivid conception of the object in order to have a trans-
parent belief about that object. This requirement, we have seen, re-
duces to (2) being true because Ralph is directly acquainted with a
spy. Thus Kaplan's solution, as was pointed out, has the effect of
saving exportation if (2) is not taken in such a way that there is a
vast difference between it and (l). If (2) and (l) are taken as vast-
14 Minor qualifications are added in section VII.
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ly different (in which case Ralph would not have a vivid conception of
the individual) then, for Kaplan, exportation fails. But it was then
asked whether there was any sense in which exportation does not fail,
if one was not to take Kaplan's route, and it was found that expor-
tation does not fail if (1) is interpreted as weak belief. There is a
resemblance here that should not go unnoticed: exportation succeeds
only if we interpret (2) in such a way that it parallels (l) or (l) in
such a way that it parallels (2). Kaplan saves exportation by constru
ing (2) so that it parallels (1); we have construed (l) so that it par
a 1 1 e 1 s (2) .
The differences between the two positions are however what is
most important. Quine's rule of exportation, without any revision
(either in how we construe (1) or in how we interpret transparent be-
lief) is not valid; it is valid only if one or the other of these re-
visions is made. So Kaplan can argue, for instance, that his psycho-
logical interpretation of transparent belief preserves the inference
by blocking the exportation of 'the shortest spy', thus preventing the
unexplainable creation of urgent information. But Kaplan's avoidance
of this anomaly of exportation assumes that it is possible to move
from opaque to transparent belief, with his move taking the role of
guaranteeing that this inference will not create urgent information.
Thus he not only maintains that (l) can be inferred from (2) only if
the subject has a direct acquaintance with a spy, but that in general
transparent belief is constrained in this way. The argument for this
general claim is that if it were not the case one could, by means of
2k
'the shortest spy', infer (I) from (2). Kaplan gives, however, no gen-
eral argument to the effect that that the rule of exportation is a
plausible one in the first place. That is, the anomalies might just
as easily be taken to suggest that exportation should be dispensed with
Quine, after all, in light of such counter examples as Kaplan presents,
seems ready enough to simply give up the rule of exportation altogeth-
er
.
1 5
On the view developed here, of course, exportation is, given the
qualifications provided below, valid. It is valid, moreover, indepen-
dently of whether the subject has a clear conception of who the object
i s
.
See Quine s reply to Sellars in Wovds and Objections, op. oit.
CHAPTER III
While Kaplan's example about the shortest spy is the most direct
motivation for thinking that transparent belief should be defined in
terms of the subject having a vivid conception of or knowing who the
object of the belief is, this conclusion is also seemingly abetted by
the observation that adding knowledge conditions to opaque belief re-
sults in what might be argued is at least logically parallel to trans-
parent belief. It has been noticed, in other words, that the argu-
ment 1 6
Smith °believes that Pa
a=b
therefore, Smith °believes that Pb
which is invalid, can be altered to:
Smith °believes that Pa
a=b
Smi th knows (a=b
)
therefore, Smith °believes Pb
which is valid. This seems, for some, to support the view that the
i nference
:
Smi th
t
bel i eves Pa
a=b
therefore, Smith Relieves Pb
16 The 'o' is to be taken to stand for 'opaque'; the ' t ' for transpar-
ent'. They signify, when attached to 'believes' in the manner below,
the appropriate sense of belief. 'Smith knows {a=b) ' should be taken
as exemplifying Hintikka's sense of 'knowing who'.
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is valid because it is implicit in transparent belief that the sub-
ject knows who the oblect is.
While it is consistent with the third inference in the above
series that
(i) Smith knows (a=b )
that s ame inference is also cons istent with the negation of (l).
Smith may believe of a particular individual a that it has P, and
though Smith does not know (contrary to fact) that a=b
,
we can none-
theless infer that Smith believes of the particular individual b that
it has P. Since the individual picked out by 'cz 1 is the same individ-
ual picked out by ‘b‘, if someone believes something about that par-
ticular individual picked out by 'a' his belief must be about that same
individual if that individual is designated in some other fashion. A
sentence's attribution of a transparent belief does not hinge on how
the individual is picked out but relates the subject directly to the
object-~it is a belief about the particular object independent of how
it is picked out and hence independent of whether the subject knows
the object under a particular description.
The nature of the subject's conceptual state is fundamental to
opaque belief, but it is wrong to try to explain transparent belief in
these terms. Whether a belief is transparent does not have to do with
the nature of the subject's concepts but rather with the relation be-
tween the subject and the object. This is not to say that the subject
will not have some conception or other of the relevant object in such
a case, but is to emphasize the independence that his conceptions can
have from
ent belief
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is relation to the object. This is the feature of transpar-
as it is conceived here, which we find incompatible with
link with opaque belief.any attempted
CHAPTER IV
Recently, Tyler Burge 1 ' has argued for what amounts to a weak
version of the thesis propounded here: he argues that it is the trans-
parent rather than the opaque sense of belief that is primary by main-
taining that the ability to correlate one's thoughts with the relevant
objects, which evidences having transparent attitudes, is fundamental
to language use as well as to the acquisition of empirical knowledge.
His definition of transparent belief is not cast solely in terms of
the subject's concepts but in terms of the contextual relation that
exists between the object, on the one hand, and the subject's concepts
on the other. "Whatever means the believer has [for picking out the
object] often depends for its success partly but irreducibly on fac-
tors unique to the context of the encounter with the object, and not
part of the mental or linguistic repertoire of the believer." 18
This argument is important for it does much to upset the tilt
toward opaque belief and as such is a first step on the road toward
the position we take here regarding weak belief as having the essen-
tial characteristics of transparent belief. It has been maintained
here that it is not necessary that the subject have a clear conception
of who the object is in order for him to have a transparent belief
about that object. We have, in other words, broken with Kaplan's def-
inition of transparent belief in terms of the subject's concepts. On
the analysis of weak belief developed here the subject has only the
17
"Belief De Re", The Journal of Philosophy lk, 338-362.
18
op. oit.
, p. 352
.
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most general concept of who the relevant object is. While Burge con-
centrates on what we would term 'strong belief', in order to show that
transparent belief is fundamental to language use, he does break with
the view that transparent belief can be defined solely in terms of the
subject's concepts. 'We, in essence, start from this point that trans-
parent belief cannot be defined in terms of opaque belief but try to
go on to extend this concept to the point where we further abstract
from the subject's concepts and speak instead of the relation an out-
side observer can view the believer as being in with respect to an ob-
ject.
CHAPTER V
So far it has been assumed that there are two ways of taking
transparent attitudes, either as weak belief or as strong belief.
This dichotomy, while serving to illustrate the important point that
the subject need not be representa t i ona 1
1 y related to the object, is
too roughly drawn to be ultimately satisfactory. It would be more ac-
curate to speak of a spectrum between the weak form and the strong form
which varies according to how clear a conception S has of x. In the
example used to illustrate weak belief the subject had absolutely no
acquaintance with (what we claimed was) the object of his beliefs.
Strong belief, on the other hand, could, as it has been developed here,
allow for the most intimate of acquaintances. It is certainly naive to
think, however, that these two extremes exhaust, all the possible rela-
tionships that exist between subject and object. The believer may, for
example, have a particular individual only 1 ittle more than vaguely in
mind a 1 r ead y a stronger belief than a weak belief—and yet have a very
imprecise and unclear impression of who this person is. Such is only
one of indefinitely many examples which land somewhere between weak and
strong belief. 19
1
9
A somewhat similar spectrum is evident in footnote three of Barbara
Partee's "Opacity, Coreference, and Pronouns" in D. Davidson and G.
Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel
,
1972).
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chapter VI
As was mentioned earlier, Ernest Sosa and others have advocated a
view similar to the one presented here. Though this view has never be-
fore been fully developed, some important points have been discussed.
The discussion by Sosa, in "Propositional Attitudes De Diato and De Re,
centers mostly on the following formulation, which he calls account III
f Relieves about x that it is F (believes x to be F) if and only
if there is a singular term a such that S believes ra is F*
,
where a both denotes x and is a distinguished term20
('S believes ra is P' is defined as "5 has a belief (in a proposition)
that, given normal circumstances, he could correctly express in our
language by asserting the sentence composed of a followed by 'is' fol-
lowed by 'F
'
.") What is to be taken as a distinguished term "is whol-
ly a pragmatic matter that can change radically from one occasion to
the next ... It [also] depends on the interests and purposes of the
speaker and hearers and on other features of the situation." 21 What
is to count as a distinguished term is decided on the basis of whether
the exportation is natural in the sense that one's hearer’s are not
thereby misled. An example of Sosa's makes this matter clear:
Consider ... the case of a prominent citizen of Metropolis who
suffers from pyromania. Impelled by his pyromania, he disguised
himself from time to time in order to start some fires, and be-
comes known to the community as "The Metropolis Pyromaniac." Now
there are other arsonists in town, but the police always know the
work of our pyromaniac by certain peculiarities of it ... Soon
after the latest fire the chief of police is asked by the press
whether anyone is suspected by the detective assigned to the case,
and he is able to reply affirmatively. For the pyromaniac has
left all the usual signs of his work and the detective suspects
20
op. ait., p. 890
2
^Ibid., pp. 890-892.
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that he started the fire. The chief ... is pleased that they arenot completely m the dark and he emphasizes this by reportingthat someone is suspected of having set the fire. 22
Here what the chief says is not misleading and thus exportation is al-
lowed. On the other hand:
Eventually our man's wife begins to wonder whether any one sus-pects that he has set any of those fires. But he is able to in-
sist that no one does. In this he is right ... What the wife isinterested in knowing is whether anyone else believes 'a is an ar-
sonist 1 where a denotes her husband and would enable the believer
without much difficulty, to identify him as the prominent citizen’,
i.e., as the man who has his place of business at such and such
an address, who lives at such and such a place, and so on. 23
Since it would be misleading for the arsonist to say to his wife that
he is suspected, exportation is not allowed in this context. The idea
of the above formulation, then, is to block exportation in circumstances
where it would be misleading and to permit exportation in situations
where a wide scope sentence which lacks urgent information is appropri-
ate
.
This view of the issue is different in some regards from Kaplan's.
That is, the original problem seemed to be that exportation allowed in-
ferences to wide scope sentences even if those sentences did not con-
vey important information. Kaplan thought that the latter inferences
should be disallowed. Sosa sees the problem, on the other hand, as
one of avoiding such inferences only in contexts where the lack of im-
portant information would be misleading. Kaplan thought that a sentence
such as (1) must convey such information; he did not conceive of there
being contexts in which it would be appropriate for such a sentence to
22Ibid.
, pp. 89^-895.
23Ibid. 3 pp. 89^-895
•
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lack urgency
.
There is also a sense in which the approach taken by Sosa is
compatable with Kaplan's. Sosa, in effect, challenges Kaplan's im-
plicit assumption, that (l) would only be said if it was thought that
Ralph had knowledge of a spy, by producing examples where this is not
the case. Presumably if Kaplan had thought that there were such
cases he would have concluded that, at least for certain contexts,
exportation is valid though no strong epistemic relation exists be-
tween subject and object.
Whichever way this is seen, Kaplan could (theoretically) reply
to Sosa s example by maintaining that the police chief actually has
quite a bit of information about the Metropolitan Pyroman i ac—even if
the chief doesn't know where to find him and doesn't know that he is a
prominent citizen. Certainly the police have considerably more knowl-
edge about the arsonist than Ralph has about the shortest spy: the
police have evidence upon which they base their claim while Ralph
bases his conclusion on common knowledge. Someone not investigating
the fires would probably not even know that the fires had been set--
much less that one person was responsible for them. Who, on the other
hand, does not consider the shortest spy to be a spy? In this way
Kaplan might argue that the chief's conception is vivid enough to meet
his standards . 24 Indeed, for any context where it is proposed that
exportation is natural and not misleading Kaplan could contend that
24 The vagueness of Kaplan's criteria allows him to fudge on these im-
portant questions and for this reason it is difficult to evaluate his
vividness proposal (on internal grounds).
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the subject’s concept is vivid enough to meet the threshold necessary
for transparent belief. To fully answer this point it would be neces-
sary for Sosa to provide an example similar to the one above but which
is such that 5 has only analytic beliefs about a:. 25 The most it would
be necessary for Kaplan to concede, as matters stand, is that his vivid
ness threshold must be lowered somewhat.
In contrast, the account we have presented answers Kaplan direct-
ly by holding that (l) (for example) is true though no strong epistemic
relation exists between subject and object. It was assumed that the
use of such a sentence would be misleading. It was therefore not neces
sary to maintain that contexts exist where exportation is natural and
not misleading though S has only analytic beliefs about x. Kaplan's
(hypothetical ) response to Sosa Is not appl icable to our account be-
cause (1) is true even in contexts where a lack of urgent information
would be unnatural and misleading.
Moreover, why should it be that appeals to what would naturally
be said (or not said) possess the authority that both Kaplan (negative-
ly) and Sosa (positively) invest them with? Can such an appeal to or-
dinary language really constitute an argument against our analysis of
(l)? Our analysis attempts to show, by appeal to various consider-
ations, that (l) is true though Ralph knows no spies. The presumption
of any analysis of this type is that its findings may conflict with
one's prereflect i ve intuitions. The argument just is that Ralph has
beliefs one wouldn't ordinarily ascribe to him. It is therefore im-
25 lf, that is, he accepted the inherent vagueness of Kaplan's vivid-
ness standards.
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proper to oppose such an analysis on the grounds that one wouldn't
otherwise have thought that he had such a belief. A similar argument
would show Sosa's appeal to the (occasional) naturalness of non-ur-
gency to be equally suspect.
Even if Sosa's example of the police chief is considered by some
to be relevant, it will remain perfectly evident to others that what-
ever may be said about the context, (l) (for example) is not true if
Ralph does not know any spies. Whether (l), it would be said, means
that Ralph has some important information about a spy is independent
of the existence of contexts where the hearer wouldn't expect such in-
formation to be conveyed. This objection has been directly answered
by independently showing that (l) has an alternative interpretation
under which it is true even if it is unnatural and non-urgent.
Though Sosa devotes the greatest part of his article to discus-
s ion of account I I I and has been thought by some to endorse i t, the
formulation he does stand behind, though he almost neglects to discuss
it, is account I : 26
S believes about x that it is F (or believes x to be F) if and
only if there is a singular term a such that S believes 'a is F 1
,
where a denotes x.
On this account a term can be exported if it denotes. While Sosa
formulates account III to determine the conditions under which "one
26The misinterpretation has been made by Hintikka in "Sosa on Prop-
ositional Attitudes De Dioto and De Re", The Journal of Philosophy
68 (1971) ^89-^97. That Sosa does not endorse account III is not en-
tirely clear in his original article. His advocacy of account I can
be seen most clearly in his "Rejoinder to Hintikka", The Journal of
Philosophy 68 (1971) A98-501 .
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can export naturally and without misleading one's hearers ," 27 he does
not believe that such an account determines logical correctness. Sosa
takes the rhetorical correctness appealed to in III to be a standard
which a logical account is not answerable to. He feels that the con-
fusion between rhetorical correctness and logical correctness has lead
to the miscategorization of contexts in which exportation is rhetor-
ically i nappropr iate. In these contexts it is, as Sosa puts it, mis-
leading to tell the truth. In the case of the pyromaniac speaking to
his wife, just as in the case of the statement by the chief of police,
One may insist that, strictly speaking the pyromaniac is suspect-
ed ... That is to say, someone does believe about the pyromaniac
that he has set some fires. For someone believes fa has set some
fires”' for some a that denotes the pyromaniac, and this entails
that he believes about the pyromaniac that he has set some fires;
i.e., it entails that he has a belief that is about the pyromani-
ac, one to the effect that he has set some fires. 2 ®
The principle operative in the case of the police statement is the
same as that in the case of the pyromaniac talking to his wife, though
in the latter case this is masked by pragmatic considerations.
Sosa thus backs away from appeals to what would ordinarily be
said and claims that exportation is valid even if it would be mislead-
ing and unnatural; though a sentence is rhetorically inappropriate it
may still be true. Thus, account I does not appeal to, and indeed
conflicts with, our pretheoretic intuitions. In this regard account I
has certain similarities with our own.
Though Sosa claims that pragmatic concerns are not relevant to
27
"Rejoinder to Hintikka", p. 581
28
"P ropos i t i ona 1 Attitudes De Dicto and De Re ", p. 896.
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the validity of a logical rule and that the misleading and unnatural
character of exportation has no relevance to and indeed masks the
rule's validity, the independence of pragmatics from semantics can
also be used, as was seen, to argue that the truth of a sentence is
independent of what it might, in a given context, be expected or be
natural for it to mean. Thus, one might try to turn Sosa's argument
for account I against itself. It is therefore necessary to provide
an understanding of how (1) could be true in a context where it is ex
pected to be urgent but is not--one that goes beyond the theoretical
statement that a confusion has been made between semantics and prag-
matics.
CHAPTER VII
Since it was assumed in the argument that (2) implies (l), that
there are spies and that there is a shortest one, it would seem that
extra premises which require the existence of the relevant object are
necessary if we are to proceed from the narrow scope to the wide. Such
a generalization would not, however, be correct. It is more accurate
to speak in terms of whether the relevant object can be individuated,
than of the object's existence. It may or may not be that non-actual
objects are i nd i v i d ua tab 1 e but our rule should not decide this issue.
The sal ient factor, at any rate, is whether the relevant object is
i nd i v i duatab 1 e . So if
(5) John believes someone set the fire
when in fact the fire was started by 1 ightning, it might seem that one
could not infer
(6) There is someone John believes set the fire
because there is no one who set the fire. But the reason (5) does not
imply (6) is not because no one set the fire but because the person who
John believes set the fire is unspec i f i ab 1 e (indefinite). If
John believes that the tallest man in Georgia (whoever he may be)
set the fire,
then one can infer, even though no one set the fire, that
There is someone (i.e. the tallest man in Georgia) that John be-
1 i eves set the fire.
There is a particular person who is in fact the object of Ralph's be-
lief-~that person who is in fact the tallest man in Georgia. Thus, it
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is the definiteness of the object that is in question. One possible
response to this might be that the requirement is that the object the
belief is about exist, not that the postulated property be true of it.
But consider 29
John believes that the most evil witch on earth (whoever she may
bej has a fast broom.
If it is the case (though sides won't be taken on this issue) that the
most evil witch can be identified (say as the wicked witch of the west)
and assuming that quantification over witches is allowed (another ques-
tion best left untouched) then
There is a particular witch, namely the wicked witch of the west,
that John believes has a fast broom.
If, however, it is merely the case that
John believes that some witch has a fast broom
then one could not infer that
There is some witch which John believes has a fast broom,
for there is no particular witch that it can be said John stands in
relation to.
This leads to the general conclusion that given a narrow scope
belief sentence, an additional premise, to the effect that the object
the belief is about is specifiable, is necessary in order to infer the
wide scope transformation.
The question also arises of whether the subject needs to actually
'be in possession' of the definite description which is exported. Does
Ralph, for instance, need to turn his mind to short spies in order for
29
l assume the nonexistence of witches.
4o
the inference from (2) to (l) to hold? Is it possible, that is, to
conclude, though Ralph really never thought of a particular spy before,
that he believes the shortest spy is a spy? Though Ralph never really
put his mind to a way of individuating one spy, is it proper to appeal
to the affirmative assertion that he would certainly make if he were
to be asked: "Do you believe the shortest spy is a spy?" While some
of our earlier remarks have assumed that Ralph has narrowed his atten-
tion to stature, it is tempting to explore these waters a bit further.
The question just posed is a corol lary to the more general (and
somewhat open) question of whether one can have beliefs about things
that one has never thought of. Certainly it can be assumed that any
rational person who believes in spies would say, if asked, that the
shortest spy is a spy ( i f he spoke sincerely). But does one have a
belief concerning something never really thought of--before it is
thought of? We would all probably say we believe that 78906274 minus
69037489 is equal to 9868785
,
if we thought about it, but did we be-
lieve it before we were asked? While we wouldn't say that we disbe-
lieved it, maybe we had no beliefs one way or the other.
(l), notice, does not read "There is someone Ralph would believe
to be a spy, if he thought about it." Thus, if one does not require
of exportation the extra premise (relativized to our example): "Ralph
believes the shortest spy is a spy," one makes the assumption that one
has beliefs about what was never explicitly thought of. Since this
extra premise is not a particularly powerful one, and since it has
tacitly been assumed that Ralph turn his attention to picking out a
kl
particular spy (this assumption being used to argue that he has a be-
lief about a particular spy), we now add this requirement to the rule
of exportation.
Earlier it was found that the requirement need not be made that
the object a belief is about exist for exportation to succeed. Exist-
ence may, however, be relevant to this rule in so far as it works to
make the object specifiable. 30 Thus if ( 5 ) is true and there is some-
one who set the fire, the person who set it could, theoretically, be
found and it could be concluded:
(6) There is someone that John believes set the fire.
Namely the person who set the fire. That is, he believes of the unique
individual who set the fire that he set the fire. This may seem like
a tr i vial i zat ion of the subject's epistemic state, but what else, after
all, does (5) say except that he believes the fire had human origins.
The belief that it had human origins, though, just is the belief that
some particular person or other set it and certainly the person who
set it must be he. The wide scope version must, on its weak interpre-
tation, be true if the narrow scope one is because once the person who
set the fire is found the 'someone' can be identified as this particular
person. Certainly John must believe that the man who set the fire, set
the fire. Again, it is not the case that John has a particular person
clearly in mind but that there is a unique individual that we cbn say
John believes set the fire.
This last inference will probably appear counterintuitive. But
30 One could also speak here of the belief being correct.
exactly what intuitions is it counter to? It would seem to conflict
with the pragmatic intuition that (6) means something more than the
almost analytic statement that it makes on our construal. But while it
is natural to expect more import from (6) than it provides (on the in-
terpretation provided here), the relevant question, as stated earlier,
is whether there is any sense at all in which (6) is true, no matter
how empty it thus seems.
The analysis presented here points away from consideration of
the subject's ancillary psychological states and towards what has
( 1 oo se ly) been called a '1 og ical 1 analysis. Though the implications
of (6) which we have drawn might be thought of as trivial, the iden-
tification of (6) as a transpar en t belief s hows that some i nferences
can be made from belief sentences without regard to psychological con-
siderations.
Since our analysis allows such freedom in making inferences that
(6) can be inferred from (5) (under specified conditions), it is use-
ful to briefly return to those sentences which do not permit of expor-
tation in order to point out that there is still a sharp contrast with
those that do. Consider again:
John believes that some witch has a fast broom.
Here there is no particular witch which John stands in relation to;
John's beliefs are such that they are applicable to no particular
(real or imagined). Thus, it is the line between the subject having
beliefs which, however vaguely or strongly, concern something and be-
liefs which concern no particular thing that determines whether the sub-
ject has a transparent belief. This line would seem to be a more sig-
nificant point of demarcation than that which lies between a vivid and
a non-vivid conception (if indeed there is such a line). Thus, the
clarity of a thought must be distinguished from whether the thought is
about anything, the latter being that which determines the type of be-
lief one has
.
CHAPTER VIII
While the above results can be extended to cover other proposition-
al attitudes, the following observations should be made. Some attitudes,
such as wanting, are such that it is often the case that the subject's
desire is non-specific, as with
John wants a sloop.
Here there is no particular sloop that is desired and thus one could
not infer that
There is a particular sloop that John wants.
While this observation of indefiniteness is subsumed under the require-
ments proposed for such an inference, in the case of wanting (and other
attitudes) certain other sentences indicate that it can be part of the
nature of the attitude itself which influences specificity.
One consideration in this regard is that we, most typically, di-
rect our wants towards the future. Thus it might be said that
John wants someone to set the fire
but not
John wants someone to have set the fire.
The latter would perhaps be more naturally put as
John wishes (or hopes) that someone set the fire.
In general, sentences of the form 'S wants it to have been true that P'
tend to be awkward. On the other hand belief is not so constrained in
this fashion. Both
John believes that someone set the fire
4A
and
John believes that someone will set the fire
are quite acceptable. This observation is important for if the sub-
ject's attitudes are directed towards the future the specificity of
the relevant object(s) is influenced. If
John bel ieves that someone set the fire
and someone did set the fire, then, (as was argued previously)
There is someone who John believes set the fire.
Namely that person who in fact set the fire-a person who, given good
enough detectives, could be found. But notice that if
John wants someone to set the fire,
and it is supposed that the fire was set, there is no one who could
(even theoretically) be pointed to as the person who set the fire--the
person who wzZZ set the fire is quite indefinite (unless one is a
strict dete rm inist). Thus, as 1 want 1 i s mos t naturally used in con-
junction with the future tense, it is apt to resist exportation.
The relation between tense and exportation also extends to other
attitudes;^ thus one could not infer from
John believes that someone will set the fire
that
There is someone John believes will set the fire.
Again, there is no definite 1 someone ' --there is no one who can be iden-
tified as the person who will set the fire. Before the fire is set
(the time of which the sentence speaks) there is no arsonist but only
31 want 1
,
however, is chara.oteristzoa.ZZy future directed.
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the description 'the person who will set the fire', which, though def-
inite, does not designate a particular person. The person who will set
the fire is undetermined, moreover, in a way that 'the shortest spy'
is not. (Notice the parallel with earlier remarks concerning non-ex-
istent objects.)
Disallowing exportation for future tense sentences avoids at
least one common objection: Assume:
John believes that some team will win next year's World Series.
Also assume that John believes that the winning team of next year's
World Series will win next year's World Series. Certainly there is
something wrong with the conclusion, which follows from these assump-
tions, that it could be said to the manager of the team that happens
to win the series, after the series has been decided, that John believed
his team would win. The only thing John believed was that some team
or other would win. There was no team, in other words, that could
have been identified, before the series, as the team John believed
would win. For this reason we limit exportation to present and past
tense sentences.
In addition to the influence of tense on 'want 1
,
there is another
difference between this attitude and the other attitudes. Consider
°^Note that the example that was given on page 11 concerning the dis-
covery of the shortest spy and our statement to him that Ralph be-
lieves that he is a spy, is relevantly different from this example;
the two types of cases should not be confused: at the time the state-
ment about Ralph's beliefs concerns, there is a shortest spy, but at
the time the statement about John's beliefs concerns there is no per-
son who will set the fire (that can be determined).
the following
John believes some team or other won,
which implies
There is some team John bel ieves won.
Notice, however, that
John wants some team or other to have won
does not imply
There is some team John wants to have won.
John may not have wanted the team that actually did win to win, though
he may have wanted there to be a winning team. While this asymmetry is
due to the difference in meaning between 'want' and 'believe', it shows
that it cannot be assumed that a semantics for 'belief' is a semantics
for propositional attitudes in general. In this regard 'want' functions
similarly to hope', 'desire', and 'wish'; 'believes' functions in the
way 'think' and 'consider' do. (Notice, moreover, that these latter
attitudes are roughly synomymous with 'belief'.) This may indicate
that the semantics of 'bel ief ' is not typical of the semantics of prop-
ositional attitudes in general.
CHAPTER IX
Consideration is now turned to the problem of quantifying into
propositional attitude contexts. While a detailed study of the origins
of this problem, as they are found in the first few pages of "Quan-
tifiers and Propositional Attitudes," is left to the Appendix, such an
examination shows, as was mentioned earlier, that the problem of quan-
tifying m was formulated in response to what Quine found to be certain
troublesome properties of transparent belief. In this section and the
next the problem of transparent belief will be stated and it will be
shown how the problem of quantifying in is a response thereto. It
will then be shown how the original problem with transparent belief is
mitigated by our earlier considerations.
Consider the following familiar story: 3 ^
There is a certain man in a brown hat whom Ralph has glimpsed
several times under questionable circumstances on which we need
not enter here; suffice it to say that Ralph suspects he is a
spy. Also there is a grey-haired man, vaguely known to Ralph
as rather a pillar of the community, whom Ralph is not aware of
having seen except once at the beach. Now Ralph does not know
it, but the men are one and the same
Quine notices that if it can be said of this particular individual
(who is called 'Bernard J. Ortcutt 1 ) that Ralph believes he is a spy
(and it appears it can) than one seems to be saddled with
(7) Ralph sincerely denies 'Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy' and
Ralph believes that Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy.
Quine finds this troublesome. The problem is that since Ralph would
sincerely say "Ortcutt is no spy" (or deny that he is one) he must
33 Quine, op. ait., p. 103
^8
believe that Ortcutt is not a spy. But, in the ref erent i a i
1 y trans-
parent sense, he believes that Ortcutt is a spy. So the problem with
(7) is that it says that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is and that he
is not a spy. This, for Quine, is the problem with transparent be-
lief.
Quine's method of rectifying this problem is to construe a be-
lief sentence such as
Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
or
Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy,
as not about the particular individual Ortcutt; by so doing, any prob-
lem with transparent belief is avoided for the sentences are not taken
as about Ortcutt. In other words Quine's idea is that in order to a-
void any problem with transparent belief, belief is to be taken opaque-
ly.
Since Quine takes the 'believes that' context as opaque, (l) in-
volves quant i f i cat ion into an opaque construction and so he says that
"when 'x' stands inside an opaque construction ... and ' (3x) ' stands
outside, the attitude to take is simply that the occurence of 'x' is
not then bound by the occurence of the quantifier." 34 There is thus a
problem of quantifying in.
Quine proceeds, in the remainder of the article, to discuss his
solution to the problem of quantifying in. That is, Quine now takes
the problem to be the following: while the wide scope renderings of
3L
*Word and Object (The M.l.T Press, I960), p. 166.
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belief sentences convey urgent information, such quantification is not
allowable. The problem, then, is no longer the problem of transparent
belief in the sense that Ralph believes Ortcutt to be a spy and believes
Ortcutt to not be a spy; the problem for Quine has now become the in-
ability to quantify into belief contexts. While the problem of quanti-
fying in is motivated by the problem of transparent belief, focus now
shifts entirely to how to alternatively allow for the wide scope read-
ing with no thought to providing an explanation of the problem of trans-
parent be 1 i ef
.
This shift away from the original problem of transparent belief
and toward solutions to the problem of quantifying in has been misquid-
ed. The original problem concerned the logic of propositional attitudes
what about the nature of belief accounts for the possibility of such
belief attributions; the problem of quantifying in, on the other hand,
is an artificial problem which belongs uniquely to Quine's analysis.
That is to say, it is in Quine's predilection to regard belief contexts
as opaque--rather than going some other route--that the problem of
quantifying in finds its origins. Thus the search Quine carries on
for an alternative formulation of (l) has of itself only internal log-
ical interest. Quine's reformulations are of interest mainly as
methods of avoiding problems, they are not of interest at the level of
explaining those problems. Failure to provide an account of transpar-
ent attitudes, as they are normally conceived, is, however, to fail to
explain the way in which transparent belief allows for problematic
belief attributions. Presumably, there is something to be explained
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about why such belief attributions are possible which might serve to
undermine the results. If such explanations are forthcoming, trans-
parent belief can be reaffirmed and the problem of quantifying in a-
vo i ded
.
CHAPTER X
In this section our previous remarks will be related to the prob-
lem of quantifying in. Within the framework we developed earlier,
Ralph's beliefs about Ortcutt are candidates for being intermediate
between weak and strong belief. Ralph certainly has someone in par-
ticular in mind who he thinks is a spy and so has a better acquain-
tance with this person than he does with the shortest spy. And yet
Ralph is really quite unclear about exactly who this person really is.
While, as Kaplan says, there are some circumstances in which we would
fail even to recognize ourselves, Ralph would fail to recognize the
man in the brown hat under some fairly ordinary sorts of circumstan-
ces. Ortcutt would not, after all, need to be presented in very much
of an obscure circumstance for Ralph to be unable to recognize him as
someone he had seen before; he apparently does not need to be presented
in a swirling fog on a dark night but rather only in a brown hat (ac-
cording to the story)
. It would seem that if Ralph does not recognize
him under these circumstances, that he does not have a very clear con-
ception of who Ortcutt is.
While it thus seems that Ralph does not have a very clear concep-
tion of Ortcutt it does, on the other hand, appear equally plausible
to say that Ralph believes about the particular individual Ortcutt that
he is a spy. On Kaplan's analysis, however, this combination is not
possible. While Kaplan does not explicitly say whether Ralph's con-
ception of Ortcutt meets his particular vividness standards, he does
make the general statement that "Ralph must have quite a solid con-
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ception of a: before we can say that Ralph believes i to be a spy . --35
It appears though that in a fairly basic sense Ralph does not have quite
a solid conception of who Ortcutt really is. Thus it would seem
reasonable to think that Kaplan would hold that Ralph does not have a
belief about the individual Ortcutt. But this seems to be strongly
counter intuitive: there is a clear intuition that in some sense
Ralph indeed has certain beliefs about Ortcutt. Quine himself in-
itially acknowledges as much in the second conjunct of (7) and only
later backtracks in response to the problems he sees in accounting
for the ultimate consequences of this view. But besides being contrary
to intuition, the conclusion that it is not the case that Ralph be-
1 ieves of Ortcutt that he is a spy (because he does not have a suf-
ficiently rich conception of who Ortcutt is) would lead to the denial
that he believes of the man in the brown hat that he is a spy (though
Ralph would insist that he does), that he believes of the man seen at
the beach that he is a non-spy (again, against Ralph's protests) and
in fact to the denial that he believes of the man in the brown hat that
he has a brown hat. For if Ralph does not know who Ortcutt is, then
the same can of course be said of the same man when he is wearing a
brown hat as well as when he is seen at the beach. Indeed, we would
have to say that Ralph has no transparent beliefs at all about this in-
dividual .
On the account presented here, on the other hand, this delemma
does not arise for we explicitly deny that the subject need have a
35op. ait.
,
p. 1 39
•
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clear conception of the object. Thus, it is possible, on our view,
to hold that Ralph's 'problematic' beliefs stem from his having an
unclear conception of who Ortcutt is.
We have presented a theory of transparent belief which is radical
in its contention that the subject need not be representat i ona 1
1 y re-
lated to the object his belief is about. This analysis extends the de-
parture from defining the transparent in terms of the opaque (initiat-
ed by Burge) to the point where we speak simply of the relation an out-
side observer can view the subject as in with respect to an object. By
doing so we feel we have accounted for the facts surrounding exportation
We also feel that our account has allowed for an explanation of the prob
lems of transparent belief.
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This appendix, which provides a close study of the first three
pages of "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," is designed to
show that the problem of transparent belief and its relation to the
problem of quantifying in are as described in the text.
Before the introduction of the example in "Quantifiers and Prop-
ositional Attitudes" which begins the argument, the only relevant move
that has been made is the introduction of the distinction between the
relational and the notional senses. For Quine (at this point in the
article) this distinction clearly comes down to the distinction be-
tween wide and narrow scope. So, for example, the relational sense of
belief in spies is represented as (1) and the notional as (2). As
Quine introduces the problem of quantifying in (PQl) it is a problem
concerning the relational sense. More specifically, PQl is a problem
concerning quantifying into propositional attitude contexts from the
outside and it is the relational sense that so quantifies.
The problem is introduced by way of an example (which was cited
in the text but which is repeated here)
There is a certain man in a brown hat whom Ralph has glimpsed
several times under questionable circumstances on which we need
not enter here; suffice it to say that Ralph spspects he is a
spy. Also there is a grey-haired man, vaguely known to Ralph
as rather a pillar of the community, whom Ralph is not aware of
having seen except once at the beach. Now Ralph does not know
it, but the men are one and the same. 36
These then are the facts of the example. Ralph has seen what he thinks
are two distinct men; the man whom he saw in the brown hat he thinks is
a spy, the man seen at the beach not a spy (but rather a "pillar of the
36op. ait.
,
p . 103-
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community ). In fact Ralph has only seen one man on different oc-
casions.
Quine goes on to develop what he sees as a problem (but which is
not yet PQI
; the word 'problem' will be used in what follows but unless
specifically noted otherwise does not refer to PQI) by asking: "Can we
say of this one man (whom Quine calls 'Bernard J. Ortcutt') that Ralph
believes he is a spy?". It would seem, intuitively, as if we could:
according to the story Ralph does suspect Bernard J. Ortcutt of being
a spy. He has seen a certain individual, he thinks that individual a
spy and that individual is Ortcutt; so, it can be said of Ortcutt that
Ralph believes him a spy. But now Quine poses what seems to be a prob-
lem: if it is said of Ortcutt that Ralph believes him a spy one is
forced into accepting a statement that would seem, prima facie, unac-
ceptable. What statement is unacceptable? As far as Quine's example
goes this is a bit unclear for though he points to
(8) w sincerely denies '...'
. w believes that...
and adds that the same sentence is to go in each of the blanks, he does
not exp 1 icitly say what that sentence is. He does go on in the next
sentence to say: "For, Ralph is ready enough to say, in all sincerity,
'Bernard J. Ortcutt is no spy'." But if this remark Is examined closely
(in the light of (8)) it will be seen that it does more to confuse mat-
ters than to clarify them. It seems, that is, from what Quine says here
that the sentence which is to be used in place of the blanks in (8) is
"Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy," for he is stating that Ralph would sin-
cerely say "Bernard J. Ortcutt is no spy" which is to say that he would
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deny "Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy." This, then, seems to indicate that
given the context of the first blank "Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy" is
the missing sentence. The context of the second blank would seem to
dictate that this is the correct sentence as well, for certainly it
can be said from what is known from the story that he believes Ortcutt
is a spy. (And it is also known that the same sentence is to qo in
both blanks.)
What tends to make the situation confusing though is that given
the original story quoted above there is no information from which
to conclude, as Ou i ne does, that Ralph would deny 'Bernard J. Ortcutt
is a spy for Ouine indicates that Ralph is not acquainted with the
name Bernard J. Ortcutt 1 and hence he would not necessarily be ex-
pected to deny Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy' but might instead simply
ask: "Who is Bernard J. Ortcutt?". The story is first given of what
Ralph thinks after which Quine asks certain questions about the indi-
vidual who (in some form or another) is the object of Ralph's thoughts
and, for the purposes of this latter discussion, this individual was
given a name. It is consistent with the above that (a) Ralph thinks
that the man he has seen at the beach is named 37 Bernard J. Ortcutt and
consequently that he thinks the man in the brown hat is named some-
37We are speaking here of names because in (7) what is under scrutiny
is Ralph's denial of a sentence and so if we said that he believed
Ortcutt was a spy, this would not necessarily mean (as we shall see
in more detail later) that he would affirm 'Ortcutt is a spy', for he
may not know him under that description.
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thing else, (b) Ralph thinks that the man in the brown hat is named
Bernard J. Ortcutt and that he thinks that the man he saw at the beach
is named something else or (c) he has never heard of the name ‘Ber-
nard J . Ortcutt 1
.
It could be that when Quine says "Ralph is ready enough to say, in
all sincerity, Bernard J. Ortcutt is no spy 1 " he means to be addinq
information to the story (though from the way he puts it he seems in-
stead to be drawing a conclusion). If so, it would have to be situa-
tion (a) above that is intended (for (a) would correspond to that ad-
dition to the story). If this is so (8) is to be filled out as
(7) Ralph sincerely denies 'Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy' and Ralph
believes that Bernard J. Ortcutt is a spy.
Quine apparently considers (7) to be an unwelcome state of affairs
though, for he speaks of "disallowing situations of the type [7]."
While it is not clear what is supposed to be meant by "disallowing"
in this sentence, it can be gathered, at least, that it is used in a
negative fash ion-- that he thinks that something must be done so that
(7) is not a problem or that something must be done that makes accept-
ing a conjunction of the type of (7) palatable.
Before examining (7) to find out what about it is troublesome, note
that the problem that Quine sees with (7) is, in a preliminary manner,
the problem that will lead him (by the bottom of the page being con-
sidered) to take certain corrective measures and it is these corrective
measures themselves (and not the difficulty which leads to them) which
make quantifying in problematic. So, the (apparent) problem with (7)
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is not the problem of quantifying in. In other words, in an effort to
correct the difficulties Quine sees with (7) measures are ultimately
introduced which constitute a different problem: POI.
But what about (7) is t roubl esome--what causes Ouine to think
that corrective measures of some sort are required? What are these
corrective measures correcting? While in this article Quine does not
speak explicitly of what he finds troublesome in (7), one element that
could be a candidate for this role is the subject's denial of the sen-
tence which expresses his belief.
Discussion of (7) was begun by citing Quine's question: "Can we
say of Ortcutt that Ralph believes he is a spy?". This question was
answered, at that time, in the affirmative because according to the
story Ralph has seen a certain individual, he suspects he is a spy and
that individual is Ortcutt. So, the second conjunct of (7) has already
been explained, for it says no more than this. The first conjunct, on
the other hand, seems not to be a direct answer to Quine's question; it
seems rather to be an answer to the question: "What would Ralph say of
the sentence 'Ortcutt is a spy'?". The answer, of course, is that Ralph
would deny it. That Ralph makes this denial is merely a consequence
of the fact of the story that Ralph is operating under the impression
that Ortcutt is distinct from the man he suspects of being a spy (as
well as that he does not think of that person who he thinks of as Ort-
cutt as being a spy)--Ralph issues his denial because he, in some sense,
does not really know who Ortcutt is.
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So it is now understood in what way each of the conjuncts simply
falls out from the story. But even though each of the parts is under-
stood, can it be said that the whole is understood? Might there not
be a conflict between saying that Ralph believes Ortcutt is a spy and
Ralph's sincere denial of 'Ortcutt is a spy'?
The idea behind understanding the relation between the parts of
(**) ' s understand i ng the difference between them. That is, there is a
distinction between what we can say of the relation between Ralph and
Ortcutt—what Ouine's question asks--and what Ralph can say of that re-
lation. We can say that the man Ralph suspects of being a spy is Ort-
cutt--the story tells us as much. Ralph does not, however, realize
that the man he suspects of being a spy is actually Ortcutt and since
he does not suspect the person who he thinks of as Ortcutt of being a
spy, he denies the sentence 'Ortcutt is a spy'.
So the difference that exists between the parts of (7) is the re-
sult of Ralph not knowing the true identity of the individuals involved.
This is to say that there is in this example a distinction between
what we can say of the relation between Ralph and Ortcutt and what
Ralph can sincerely say of that relation.
There is, however, another aspect of (7) which must be considered.
It would seem that from Ralph's sincere assertion: "Ortcutt is no spy"
(which Ouine tells us Ralph is ready enough to say in all sincerity),
that it could be concluded that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is no spy
(using the principle that one believes what one sincerely asserts).
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Combining this with the second conjunct of (7) it could be said that
Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and that Ralph believes Ortcutt
is no spy. While it cannot be said that the facts of the story clearly
point to this conclusion, it remains open to that interpretation. Per-
haps, then, what Quine finds problematic is that we can say that Ralph
teves that Ortcutt is a spy and that he believes that Ortcutt is no
spy.
At this point Quine's views on the transparent/opaque distinction
must be discussed; by considering certain passages from Word and Object
the function (7) has in Ouine's argument will be more easily discerned.
As Quine distinguishes transparent from opaque belief it is a dis-
tinction having to do (at least to some extent) with whether or not
the (relevant) sentence says that Ralph (stating matters in terms of
the example being considered) stands in relation to the man Ortcutt.
Thus Quine says in Word and Object: "If belief is taken transparently,
then ['Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline'] expresses an out-
right relation between the man Tom and Cicero, ... if the relation is
taken opaquely, then [this sentence] expressly relates Tom to no
man
.
1,38
The fact that Quine distinguishes transparent belief as relating
the subject to a particular individual is illuminating because it was,
it will be recalled, the question: "Can we say of this man ... that
38
op. cit.
, p . 1 A5
•
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Ralph believes him to be a spy?-, which brought forth ( 7 ) in response.
In this question he is asking about what can be said of the story using
transparent belief, and therefore ( 7 ), it being the response to this
question, is to be interpreted transparently.
It is important to understand that Quine has in mind the transpar-
ent sense of belief when he considers (7) because, as may be known, he
has argued in Word and Object that transparent belief has certain log-
ical problems connected with it. If it is indeed true that Quine is
construing ( 7 ) transparently, it then becomes somewhat more evident what
he finds problematic therein--the problem he sees with (7) becomes ex-
plainable in terms of the problem which he finds inherent in trans-
parent bel ief
.
In speaking of the sentence
There is someone whom I bel ieve to be a spy,
which is interpreted transparently, Quine points out that it imparts in-
formation of an urgent kind, but then adds: "Yet let its urgency not
blind us to Its oddity." The indented sentence above should appear
familiar in that it is a mi no r variation of our (l). So Qu i ne is here
starting at the same place that he started from in "Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes": he is trying to show that sentences such as
(l) are problematic. In Word and Object however the differences in ap-
proach are illuminating. The source of the difficulty is here explicit-
ly presented as transparent belief and is presented in such a way that
it can be seen that this same problem underlies the problem with (7).
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To see this consider Quine's familiar example where we "Suppose
that though
(9)
Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline
he is ill-informed enough to think that Cicero of the orations and
Tully of De Seneotute were two. "39 The prob|em „hat ?u . ne f , nds here
is shown when he says
Tully
,
Tom insists, "did not denounce Catiline. Cicero did."
^
U
I"?
Y
,
T°m mUSt be acknowledged to believe, in every sense, thatlully did not denounce Catiline and that Cicero did. But stillhe must be said also to believe, in the referent i a 1
1 y transpar-ent sense, that Tully did denounce Catiline. The oddity of the
transparent sense of belief is that it has Tom believing that Tul-
ly did and that he did not denounce Catiline. 14'®
The parallel with our example should be evident: since Ralph (para-
phrasing the above) insists "Ortcutt is no spy" surely Ralph must be
acknowledged to believe that Ortcutt is not a spy. But still he must
be said also to believe, in the referent ia 1
1 y transparent sense that
Ortcutt ts a spy. The 'oddity' of (7) is that it has Ralph believing
that Ortcutt is and that he is not a spy. So the 'oddity' of the trans-
parent sense of belief is what Quine finds problematic in (7) 41 and
this is the problem with transparent belief.
The following sentences (which Quine cites) are, in some sense,
true of the story:
(10) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy
(11) Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy.
33Ibid
.
,
p . 145.
k0Ibid.
,
p. 148
41 Using Ralph's assertion "Ortcutt is no spy" in place of the first con-
junct of (7) •
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If we construe (10)-(11) as speaking of a relation between Ralph and a
particular individual (Ortcutt) these sentences say of that individual
that Ralph believes him a spy and that Ralph does not believe him a
spy. Quine wishes to rectify this situation and does so by construing
(10) (11) as not about the particular individual Ortcutt, for in this
way these sentences do not say of that particular man that Ralph does
believe him a spy and that he does not believe him a spy, for they are
not taken as about Ortcutt. While it appears that this solution only
applies to this one version of Quine's problem, Quine's idea is that in
general belief is to be construed opaquely in order to avoid any problem
which might arise by taking belief sentences transparently.
One way to make the distinction between construing the object of
Ralph s be 1 ief as a particular individual and construing the object of
his belief as someone in general, is by making the distinction between
wide and narrow scope. 42 Making the distinction this way, it may seem
as though Quine is interpreting (10)-(ll) small scope, for so interpret-
ed they are indeed not about Ortcutt.
That regarding (10) — (1 1 ) small scope would be the reasonable al-
ternative for Quine to opt for is supported by the direct association
of transparent belief with the wide scope interpretation and opaque be-
lief with the narrow scope interpretation. What Quine, after all, sees
a problem with is transparent belief, and therefore the elimination of
the wide scope interpretation would seem to accomplish his purpose. It
42We speak here of the scope of the quantifier.
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is thus difficult to say exactly why Quine has not chosen to simply ban
wide scope renderings of belief contexts. What is not difficult to
demonstrate however is that this is in fact not the method he has chosen
to use in accomplishing his ends.
The method Quine does employ for construing (10)
-(1 1 ) as not about
the individual Ortcutt and for avoiding the vagaries of transparent
belief can best be observed by consideration of his own words: "The
that 1 must be viewed in [10] and [11] as sealing those clauses off,
thereby rendering [10] and [11] compatible because not, as wholes, a-
bout Ortcutt at all."43 The idea here is that the belief context is to
be regarded as opaque because so construed (10)
-(11) will not be about
the individual Ortcutt and in this way these sentences will not say of
that particular individual that Ralph does and does not believe him
to be a spy. So Quine's argument is that belief must be construed o-
paquely in order to avoid the problems inherent in construing belief
t rans pa rent 1 y . Thus while viewing belief opaquely is the answer to
the problem of transparent belief, this comes not by taking (lO)-(ll)
small scope but instead by simply regarding the 'believes that' con-
text as opaque.
Some of Quine's words, specifically: "...thereby rendering [10]
and [11] compatible...," also show, as has been contended, that he re-
gards those sentences, when taken to be about the individual Ortcutt,
as not compatible. This problem is avoided by taking (10) — (1 1) as not
4
3
"0uan t i f i er s and Propositional Attitudes", op. ait
.
,
p. 103-
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about Ortcutt.
Now that it has been seen how Quine construes such sentences as
Oo)-(n), the last step in the argument that there is a problem of
quantifying in can be taken. The method of construing the 'believes
that' context as opaque has the consequence that ' (te) (Ralph believes
that at is a spy)' involves quantification into an opaque construction.
But, Quine contends, because of the failure of subs 1 1 tut i v i ty of iden-
tity when 'x 1 stands inside an opaque construction and ... ' (3x) 1
stands outside, the attitude to take is simply that the occurance of
X
' S n0t then bound b y the occurence of the quantifier." 45 This then
is the problem of quantifying in.
The last move of the argument, then, is that since failures of
substitutivity of identity cannot be allowed quantification into o-
paque contexts must be banned. While it would take this discussion too
far afield to consider all the issues involved here, notice that even
if it is assumed that belief must be construed opaquely (and the con-
siderations provided here have shown that it need not) there are a mul-
titude of ways of dealing with failures of substitutivity and hence it
is not a priori, evident that all quantification into opaque contexts
must be avoided. Quine, however, provides no argument to the effect
that his proposal should be the preferred option.
44 The role of the failure of the principle of substitutivity of iden-
tity is made explicit in Word and Object (see p. 151), though not in
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes". The reasoning however ap-
pears to be the same in both places.
4
5
Word and Object3 p. 166.
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Thus, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", according to
Quine belief sentences are essentially amb
i
guous- they can be taken
transparently or opaquely. He thinks that there is a difficulty which-
ever way they are interpreted.^ If they are interpreted transparently
the type of problem which has been discussed here arises. On the other
hand 47 they can be read opaquely, thus avoiding any problems with trans
parent belief, but it then becomes improper to quantify in.
Word and Object, on the other hand, Ouine's position isbelieves that 1 context can never be quantified into--it is,
says, "unequ i voca 1
1 y opaque" (p. 150).
that a
as Quine
Quine uses this phrase "on the other hand' himself in "Quantifiers
and Propositional Attitudes" in such a way as to reinforce the con-
clusion drawn here that a choice can be made (along the lines we have
1 nd 1 cated)
.


